выступал на уроке политэкономии и сказал, что у нас нет своей техники, мы только используем буржуазную технику. Группа из трех комсомольцев протаскивали антисоветскую теорию об устойчивости лично-крестьянского хозяйства, а один из них – занимался анекдотами против Сталина» [ГАСИ ЧР. Ф. 1114. Оп 1. Д. 3. Л. 135–36].

Таким образом, молодежное сознание, вступая в борьбу с идеологическим натиском большевиков формировал устойчивый шаблон восприятия у большинства молодых людей. Не называя это покорностью, а формой адаптации к социально-политическому климату в стране, стоит отметить, что это сознание формировало и протестные формы, а также формы многогранной трансформации как исторического, так и культурного плана.

Государственный архив современной истории Чувашской Республики. (ГАСИ ЧР). Ф. 6 (Обком комсомола Чувашской АССР); Ф. 1110 (Чувашский государственный педагогический институт); Фонд 1114 (Чувашская сельскохозяйственная академия).

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D. Shlapentokh

CRIME, PUSSIAN REVOLUTION AND THE ORIGINAL OF THE SOVIET REGIME

В современной западной интерпретации революция обычно означает переход от одного социально-экономического и политического порядка к другому. Однако в некоторых случаях революция ведет к общей социальной деградации и росту преступности. Именно это имело место в годы Русской революции(ий) и Гражданской войны (1917–1918). Усиление большевистского террора и последующее тоталитарное окостенение общества было, по крайней мере отчасти, следствием этой деградации.

К л ю ч е в ы е с л о в а: Русская революция, советский режим, советское общество, Красный террор, преступность.

The word “revolution” literally means “rotation”, and in the premodern past it indeed was nothing but the change from one dynasty to another. “Revolution” had acquired its present-day meaning only after the French Revolution. At that time, “revolution” became a change in social or political

systems. The word "revolution" also acquired a rather positive meaning in most of the writings about revolution. Therefore, those who define the Bolshevik takeover as "revolution" usually look at it positively. Those who talk about the "Bolshevik coup" see the events in mostly a negative light. The vision of revolution is also implied, at least in most Western narratives, a liberation from oppression. Consequently, those who deal with revolutions always call the events in France from 1789 to 1794 as the "French Revolution". Still, practically no one among Western scholars called what happened in Germany in 1933 the "Nazi Revolution", albeit from a formal point of view it was indeed a modern revolution, which entailed the transition from one political and social order to another. Still, the "revolution", as the events could not always been seen as a socio-political change, and the old definition of "revolution" as just a change of dynasty could be more appropriate. In this model of revolution, there was not much change of the social-political composition, but it marked a general meltdown, with a rise in crime. The "revolutionary" regime, in such cases, engaged not just in the change of social-political order but became the force which restored the basic order: "revolutionary" and "counter-revolutionary" actions became the two sides of one process. And Hobbes' explanatory model became as important as Marxism, the philosophy of the Enlightenment, etc. While elements of social breakdown could be seen in any revolution, it became especially strong in premodern/"postmodern" societies. Russia could be here a good example.

The revolution(s) of 1917 were marked by strong pulls for anarchy, social decomposition and a rise in crime. There were several reasons for the rise in crime. First, it was due to the general mentality of Russian peasants, the majority of Russian society; secondly, it was due to the collapse of the monarchy, the forces of not just external restraint, but the anchor of the Ten Commandments. Thirdly, it was the hardships of WWI, and the revolution which pushed many Russians to follow the criminal road just to survive.

The West and criminal mentality

Those who study Russian popular lore could easily find the glorification of crime and criminals. These glorifications of the criminal and romanticized image of criminal life was certainly not specific to Russian history. It had been a part of Western European tradition for quite some time. It was common to European traditions throughout the Middle Ages and was resurrected somewhat in the mind of the Western European intellectuals during the Romantic period. Still, by the modern era, the praise of the criminal element had ceased to be popular among European society, and Western society in general.

It is true that the image of successful bandits as peculiar revolutionaries/avengers of the populace's misery, or plainly as daredevils who succeeded against all odds, continued to be popular in the West. This image continued to fascinate Western historians, writers and movie producers. Still, these images have nothing to do with reality and the general attitude of the average citizen of modern Western society. They are the mirror image of reality. They show not what really exists, but its opposite. They could well be compared to erotica, or often openly pornographic images, which are common in American culture. Still, they informed not much about real life, but what is actually opposite to it. Real, not imaginary, American life is quite restrictive, and even prudish in anything related to actual sexuality. The same could be said about the image of criminals/bandits. It is mostly a mirror image of the mentality and behavior of the average Caucasian Westerner. The abhorrence of criminal behavior was caused by the socio-economic realities of modern capitalism.

Indeed, the development of capitalism had finally shored up the concept of private property as the sacred backbone of society. The embracement of private property fit in well with the acknowledgement of human rights and political liberties, and the universalization of the Ten Commandments. Certain acts – e. g. taking someone's property for private benefit – became negative, regardless of the relationship between the persons – and some of the basic elements of social interaction became axiomatic for people, regardless of their political beliefs. These ideas in their various degrees were not only espoused by the elite, but deeply internalized by the majority of populations. This was precisely what Russia was lacking and was the primary reason why the criminals were regarded by the populace as the existential model, indeed an example to be followed.

Russian peasants and Westerners: different mentalities and behavioristic models

Russian peasants with their particular mentality constituted the bulk of Russian society. This mental mindset was shaped by the Russian historical tradition. It would be wrong to regard peasants as "immoral" in comparison to "moral" Westerners. Moreover, many Russian peasants, as well as other people of "premodern"/"postmodern" society would regard Westerners, and actually people from the Russian cities, already living according to the capitalist model by the late 19th century, as "immoral". A peasant would note, for example, that Westerners could be polite, smiling and sharing food and drink with peasants. Still, this would not prevent them from taking advantage of the peasants. He would also note that what he, the peasant, regarded as sacred ties

of friendship, community and blood relationship, play little or no role for Westerners. In short, Westerners were sly, deceptive and implicitly morally "rotten" – the idea well-developed by XIXth-century Slavophiles and, of course, not only them. For Westerners, however, Russians had no respect for formal contractual obligations. This difference in perspective was due to the fact that Russian peasants, even in the beginning of the 20th century, still lived in patriarchal/premodern conditions. Most of them, even after Stolypin reforms, were not landowners, and mostly regarded the formalities of law as being imposed on them by officials; the people with power who demanded not just following these legal abstractions, but also taxes and military service. Neither law nor these obligations were actually internalized by peasants. It would be wrong, however, to assert that Russian peasants saw in crime, and actually society, without strong authority as quite a positive phenomenon. Actually, the love for license had co-existed in the peasant mind with absolutely different feelings: fear of lawlessness and anarchy. Thus, he both craved criminal license as an opportunity to enjoy life – e. g. property, women, liberation from any social obligations – and, at the same time, loath to experience it for he could not be just a successful criminal, but also the victim of crime. Still, this fear of crime and anarchy emerged only at the end of the process, whereas in the beginning of upheaval, he usually believed that he could well benefit from it. Thus, in the beginning of the revolution, peasants and soldiers, "peasants in uniform", regarded criminal license as mostly an opportunity. And peasants' anti-legalistic/criminal mind manifested itself and was clearly related to little sense of private property and, therefore, legalistic web which made private property possible.

Russian conditions and criminal behavior

Russian peasants had not developed strong feelings for private property, plainly because they were not the proprietors of their major commodity – land. Indeed, peasant communes, with their periodical land redistributions, continued to exist until the very end of the tsarist regime. And this was one of the major reasons why law and, in a way, the Ten Commandments in their universal application, did not hold much ground in peasant society. This led to basic rejection of the idea of private property or at least in its Western application. One should point out that this disregard for private property was not an exclusively Russian phenomenon. It was an essential element of any country of the premodern era. Still, in the West, after the entrenchment of capitalism, private property became a sacred cow. This was not the case with Russia. It would be wrong to state that the disrespect for private property and related

disregard for formalities of the law were always seen negatively. Indeed, it was often seen as a blessing for quite a few Russian intellectuals, from the Slavophiles to the Populists, who saw in that attitude a source of Christian self-negation and socialist propensities, as well as the general broadness of the Russian soul with its abhorrence of material goods. There were some good points in this vision of the Russian national psyche; one should remember here that the peasant characteristic/mentality had a lasting impact on some segments of the elite and especially Russian intelligentsia, which had also despised property, accumulation of wealth, and legal formalities in general. These qualities were often admired by Westerners.

Still, there were a number of negative repercussions of this disregard for private property. With this rationale, the restraints prohibiting the peasants from taking property belonging to others, those who were not a part of their household or peasant commune, were viewed as artificial by their very nature. The restraints were not internalized but rather rejected by the peasantry, and it was often only the power of the state which prevented them from engaging in criminal behavior. Indeed, the police were to prevent them from taking the belongings of others. The peasants' desires to appropriate these effects did not always translate into a desire to "socialize" the goods, i. e., to bring the property to the commune and live in the commune. The drive for appropriating property actually often had nothing to do with an attempt to change one social system into another, but simply to eliminate what peasants regarded as artificial social constraints. There was also a glorification of the criminal way of life. The successful bandit became viewed as the new popular hero and life in a criminal gang as the happy life in an almost deal society. The successful bandit was also seen as revolutionary, for he liberated the masses from their repression, in this case from the restraints of the larger society. The revolution and the final liberation could now be viewed as the triumph of criminality. While this view did not completely dominate the popular psyche, it was an important part of it and coincided with other images. Given these convictions, it was not surprising that the Russian populace cherished the image of Sten'ka Rasin, who from some perspectives was nothing but a triumphant bandit. As a matter of fact, his image as the leader of the peasant rebellion was not separated from the reputation of his successful looting expeditions.

With their predisposition to criminal behavior, which visibly increased with the end of serfdom in 1861, the czarist regime was a powerful check on peasants' criminal behavior. The role of the Tsar was manifold. He was the leader of the state and its repressive machinery. Still, he was more than that. As I noted, peasants, as other people of premodern/postmodern societies, usually

compartmentalized the Ten Commandments. They regarded as their sacred duty to help members of the same peasant commune and were ready to sacrifice their very lives for kin or friend. At the same time, they could well ignore or prey on those whom they regarded as outsiders. Still, this model, as any model, could not address the complexity of societal relationships. The sense of universality of the Ten Commandments in the peasant mind was weak, or at least fragile. Still, the notion existed, due to the presence of church and the "little father" – the Tsar, to whom all members of Russian society were "children". All of them constituted a peculiar "family", which entailed a sort of mutual obligation for all "family" members. The Tsar was the very fulcrum of Russian society; at least this was the case for peasants. Consequently, the collapse of the monarchy was for them not just the collapse of a certain political order, but order in itself.

The end of monarchy and collapse of order

It would be an oversimplification to see the collapse of authority as the simple shifting of ideological paradigms from that of the monarchism to liberal capitalism and then to radical socialism. Indeed, for many people, World War I and the revolution, signaling the end of the sacred institution of the monarchy, implied, to use one of Dostoevsky's expressions, that "there is no god; therefore everything is permissible". In 1917, even some liberals, who believed that Russia should follow the road of the West much more so than others in Russian society, understood that at the beginning of the century, Russia could not be held together simply by the rule of law, as was the case in the West.

Paul Miliukov, the leading liberal politician, was one man with such a view. He was aware that Russia was not a legally bound *Gesellschaft* society, but rather a *Gemeinschaft* society: a society based on unwritten, yet internalized laws. In the sacredness of the monarchy, it was believed that the "little father" kept the country together. Miliukov undoubtedly understood that the power of the monarch as a cementing force of Russian society was being reduced both by the continuing process of Westernization, as well as by political upheavals. The Tsar, a God-anointed charismatic leader, was still a part of the Russian statehood and the end of the czardom would be disaster. It would not transform Russia into a democratic republic, but would unleash anarchy on the land. This was the reason why Miliukov urged Mikhail, Nicholas' brother, to take the crown. According to contemporary accounts, Miliukov's address to Mikhail, while not cohesive in speech, was very passionate in voice: "If you refuse ...

your highness ... it would be disaster. Because Russia ... Russia is losing ... her backbone ... The monarchy ... this is the backbone ... the only backbone of the country ... the Russian masses, around what ... around what would they assemble themselves? If you reject this ... it could be anarchy ... chaos... a bloody mess ... Monarchy – this is the nucleus ... the only substance which everyone knows ... This is the only commonality to Russian citizens ... the only meaning of power ... in Russia … until now" [Shul'gin, p. 538]. The feeling imparted here is certainly that the end of the monarchy was nothing less than the end of the entire value system and the state itself [Svetlanin, p. 59]. It was not just the end of tsardom as the framework for societal existence, but the collapse of its major institutions and economic fabric. First, the army collapsed.

Army and spread of crime

The beginning of WWI had originally led to a great upsurge in patriotism and the desire to fight for country and tsar – the country's very symbol. And here Russia was not very different from other countries engaged in the war. This great enthusiasm, however, subsided as the horrors of war increased, and here again Russia was not very different from other countries engaged in the war. Still the army basically held its ground through 1914–1917, despite several serious defeats. General Brusilov's successful offensive indicated this. Still, the February/March Revolution apparently led to a dramatic change. The present-day Russian historiography, at least as it manifested itself in the works of Russian journalists, blame the Bolsheviks for the problems. They were agents of foreign influence (*agenty vlianiia*), fifth columnists, people foreign to Russia and obsessed with their artificial theories on how to change Russia and the world. They stabbed Russia in the back and snatched victory which had been near.

This theory looks quite similar to those which circulated in German society after the country's defeat in WWI. Still, a close look at events indicates that the Bolsheviks' role was rather marginal. The end of tsardom, the system which had held society together, at least as it was seen by soldiers, "peasants in uniform," was the major problem. In addition, the hardships of the war, abolition of capital punishment as well as "Order 1", which introduced "election" of officers, also played a role in the disintegration of the army. Retreating troops became marauding hordes which engaged in all types of outrages. Desertion became a mass phenomenon and armed deserters often became bandits. The disintegration of the army was not the only reason for the rise in crime, especially violent crime. There were also the economic problems.

Economic problems and crime

The general disintegration of the country's economy threw millions of workers into the streets. Some of them went to the countryside, while others could find nothing to do. They were very bitter and lost belief in any political creed. They shed their political affiliations to any institutions. There were also quite a few who interpreted the socialist slogans of Bolshevik leaders as a license to steal. They took the idea of the distribution of the national wealth literally – by their own hands. Their views on life might be represented by the attitudes of some of the workers of post-Soviet Russia who found that they were actually deceived by the post-Communist leaders. In fact, while they blamed all workers' problems on the party bureaucracy, the victory of the party's opponent brought them even worse misery and many of them feared losing their jobs. In their anger, they sought to participate in the robbery of the emerging post-Soviet *nouveau riche*. One of them made his point clear enough to a correspondent of the newspaper: "This means that we are working for the fellows from the business. If the mine will be closed, we will go to rob garages and apartments. If the life of the people will not be again normal, this is quite possible" [Komsomol'skaia Pravda].

In the condition of general lawlessness, especially strong in the beginning of the Revolution and Civil War, the criminal and semi-criminal way of life became appealing, not just for a considerable segment of the hoi polloi, but even for members of the tsarist elite and intelligentsia, at least those who were able to survive.

Predominance of criminal ethos

The general chaos and sense of all permissiveness had strongly affected all segments of the population. Still, it was the masses, especially the peasants and deserting soldiers, who became especially affected by the new conditions. As was already noted, the criminal behavior was integrated in the peasant mind together with the opposite drive – the fear of anarchy, and the desire for strong power. For many peasants and soldiers, criminals indeed emerged as the manifestation of a role model. In the eyes of quite a few of the representatives of the Russian populace, the revolutionaries were glamorized just because they were successful bandits. A. Vetlugin, the talented ймigrй writer and a witness and participant in the Civil War, asserted that the very reason why the populace had not followed the liberals and anti-Bolsheviks was because these intellectuals did not conform to the peasants' propensity for stealing, and as such did not live up to their image of success. Indeed, the liberal intellectuals of pre-revolutionary Russia were often students. "The science

of the student, teacher was wrong, boring science. He taught that it was prohibited to steal – 'these are not yours!' He knew everything, but his boots were worn out and he had patches covering holes in the seat of his pants" [Vetlugin, p. 389]. In contrast to the poor student, the revolutionary sailor, the representative of the new authorities, enjoyed greater popularity among the peasants. The reason was simple. The sailor was the perfect image of the successful bandit and his story promised to the masses the perfect, happy criminal life. This was indeed what many of them considered the revolution to be all about: "The sailor was well made and ruddy, he had a diamond ring, a gold cigarette case, lacquered boots, he measured *kerenky* by *arshins* and instead of eating flower seeds he smoked 'Gala Peters.' He started his life by killing the priest and legitimizing promiscuity. This was indeed a real lesson!" [Ibid].

While in this appraisal of the sailor, one could argue that for all of the love the populace had for the "sailor" as a successful bandit, they also respected him as some crude representative of the new social justice. Indeed, the same could be said about the popular images of such personalities as Stepan Rasin. This was undoubtedly true in many cases. Yet there is evidence that the populace had an affinity for criminals just because they were successful. They loved the sailors and at the same time were attached to the image of the revolution as a social phenomenon which would liberate the populace from any social obligations of any kind. The prospect of liberation was the most important for the peasants and was often in no way connected, even in the most vague way, with the actual revolutionary forces. Interestingly, the populace had an attachment not only to the revolutionary sailor, the pure symbol of Soviet power, but equally so to the speculator, the "bag man" who was strongly at odds with the same Soviet power. Elaborating on the image of the speculators in the mind of the populace, Vetlugin wrote the following: "The railroad became the center of attention. The people who move along it were similar to the careless birds of the sky. They were not afraid of the famine, they drank and ate as much as they wanted, had beautiful women for making love, played cards and had one job – to ride the railroad. The 'speculator' ('*piskuliant*' – corrupted in popular parlance the word '*spekuliant*') became the beloved hero of the Russian people …" [Ibid., p. 388].

The criminalization of the value system affected not only the populace, but the represntatives of the upper classes as well. Many of them had joined the masses in their lifestyle and mentality because of the hardships of the revolution and war. While some of the upper class members were able to preserve their old values, although living the life of the masses, this was not always the case. Many became absorbed by the popular psyche and started to share

the views of the masses, complete with their visions of the successful criminal as hero. The criminalization of their minds, so to speak, moved some of them closer to the Soviet system, for the members of the system were regarded first of all as successful criminals. This was especially the case for the youngsters of the upper classes. Vetlugin provided the following portrait of one such youngster, his relative, a hawker in one of Moscow's flea markets: "Despite the absence of adequate merchandise, the toughness of character and the assortment of obscenities, put my Moscow nephew in the forefront of the salespeople of Trubnyi market … The young salesgirls (the ex-students of the Smol'nyi institutes, the schools for the upper class women in imperial Russia) keep their eyes on him and demonstrate to him the nature and the art of love making absolutely free of charge. With the local member of Cheka he enjoys the most friendly relationship and often visits Lubianka (Secret Police headquarters in Moscow) to drink tea and eat the white bread brought by the relatives of those who were executed. A long time ago he broke away from the bourgeoisie morality and could steal with extraordinary skill a loaf of bread or chunk of lard from the absent-minded peasant. He was not yet engaged in murder, he only watched with adoration the deeds of certain Sen'ka, the guardsmen who robbed the *bogoradskoe* treasury. He did not attend school. The hours of the school day conflicted with the busiest market time" [Ibid., p. 12].

It was not just children from the upper and middle class who became enticed to be part of the underworld. This was also the case with adults. In the new society of social and moral uncoupling, it became plausible for a person "from a good family", a person with a respectable middle-class background, to be the leader of a gang of criminals. [Novyi Vechernii Chas]

The spread of crime, especially in the beginning of the revolution and Civil War, was structurally similar to what would happen in the country in the future. Indeed, to some degree this situation also manifested itself in Soviet Russia under Gorbachev, when the rapid changes in the political values led to an existential vacuum of sorts, and this vacuum coupled with the weakening of the state led to a rise in crime since the beginning of Gorbachev's reforms [Sovetskaia Kul'tura].

Response

The spread of criminality and similar behavior does not necessarily lead to the powerful response from the state. Disorder could lead to a variety of solutions. One of them was the institutionalization of banditry, and the emergence of hierarchical structures of criminals who, in the process, would create an alternative social order. This was, for example, the case in the Middle Ages,

which followed a centuries-long period of chaos and criminality. The hierarchical feudal order, based on protection and patronage in exchange for goods and services, looks surprisingly similar to what emerged in the late Yeltsin/early Putin Russia as an elaborate and hierarchical structure of "roofs" (*krysha*).

In the case of the early Bolshevik regime, the model was different. It is true that the repressive machinery of the state could sometimes collaborate with criminals and/or incorporate them into their midst. Still, the preferred model was different. Criminals, especially violent criminals, were, in most cases, mercilessly exterminated by the Red Terror; their fate, of course, was not different from that of the real or imaginary political enemies of the regime or those social groups which the regime also regarded as dangerous. Therefore, one could assume that crime and social decomposition in years of revolution and civil war played an important role in upholding the country's political culture when strong power is the only guarantee of basic order.

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С. А. Шмелев

БЫТ КОММУНИСТОВ ЭПОХИ НЭП И ВОПРОСЫ ПАРТИЙНОЙ ЭТИКИ

Статья посвящена проблеме формирования нового быта коммунистов в период реализации новой экономической политики и вопросам партийной этики, ставших актуальными в связи усилением мелкобуржуазных интересов и угрозой разложения партии.

Ключевые слова: новый быт, партийная этика, «болезни» партии, партийные контрольные комиссии.

С началом строительства социализма в СССР в 1920-е гг. повседневная бытовая жизнь людей, в прежние времена складывавшаяся стихийно и находившаяся во власти обычаев и традиций, попала в сферу